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PREVIEW; United States v. Cooley: Tribal Police Authority Over a
Non-Indian on a Public Right-of-Way in Indian Country
Shelby Danna*
The United States Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument in
the matter of United States of America v. Joshua James Cooley on
Tuesday, March, 23, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. via telephone. Jeffery B. Wall will
likely appear on behalf of the Petitioner, United States of America. Eric R.
Henkel will likely appear on behalf of the Respondent, Joshua James
Cooley.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents a question about tribal jurisdiction in Indian
Country over non-Indians. Specifically, the Court will decide whether a
tribal police officer has the authority to detain and search a non-Indian on
a public right-of-way within a reservation for a possible violation of state
or federal law.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2016, Joshua Cooley and his child were sitting in
a parked truck with Wyoming license plates on the westbound shoulder of
U.S. Route 212 at around 1:00 a.m.1 This portion of the highway is within
the Crow Indian Reservation in southern Montana.2 Around that time, law
enforcement officer for the Crow Police Department, James D. Saylor,
drove past Mr. Cooley’s truck and decided to stop for a welfare check on
the vehicle’s occupants.3 During the encounter, Officer Saylor perceived
that Mr. Cooley was a non-Indian and had bloodshot eyes.4 Mr. Cooley
informed Officer Saylor that he travelled to Lame Deer to purchase a
vehicle from a man named Thomas “Spang” or Thomas “Shoulderblade.”5
Mr. Cooley was unsure of Thomas’s last name.6 Officer Saylor recognized
both potential names: Thomas Shoulderblade was a local probation
officer, and Thomas Spang was “associated with drug activities on the
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation.”7
Based on the surrounding circumstances, including the time of
night, the Wyoming license plates, and the reference to a “Thomas,”
Officer Saylor concluded that Mr. Cooley’s story did not make sense.8 Mr.
Cooley then became agitated and, at Officer Saylor’s request, lowered the
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window further.9 Officer Saylor saw two rifles in the passenger seat and
ordered Mr. Cooley to produce identification, while continuing to
interrogate him.10 Mr. Cooley, searching for identification, started slurring
his speech, and his breathing became shallow and rapid.11 Concerned,
Officer Saylor ordered Mr. Cooley to show his hands and to again produce
identification.12 Mr. Cooley produced his Wyoming driver’s license.13
Officer Saylor ordered Mr. Cooley out of his truck and performed a pat
down search. Officer Saylor placed him in the back of the patrol car while
waiting for back up.14 To secure the area, Officer Saylor went back to Mr.
Cooley’s truck, where he seized the ignition key and weapons, and
discovered a glass pipe and plastic bag that appeared to contain
methamphetamine.15 When backup officers from the county and the
federal Bureau of Indian Affairs arrived, they transported Mr. Cooley to
the Crow Police Department, where he was interviewed and arrested by a
county officer.16
Mr. Cooley was charged by a federal grand jury with one count of
possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(a).17 Mr.
Cooley moved to suppress evidence on the ground that Officer Saylor
exceeded the Crow Tribe’s authority during the seizure, in violation of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.18 The
district court granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.19 This appeal followed.
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

A. Petitioner United States’ Argument
Petitioner argues on appeal that, as independent sovereigns, Indian
tribes retain the inherent authority to reasonably investigate and detain
non-Indians within tribal reservations for potential violations of state or
federal law.20 Petitioner states that United States v. Wheeler21 further
solidified these longstanding rights, because they have not been
diminished by treaty or statute.22 Further, Petitioner contends ICRA’s
Fourth Amendment analogue ensures the public is adequately protected
and laws are enforced on Indian reservations.23 The policy behind this
9
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inherent authority, Petitioner maintains, is to ensure tribal police have the
right to respond to criminal activity and protect themselves and others
from harm.24
Petitioner then argues that, historically, the Court has never
questioned a tribe’s authority to police and patrol roads and rights-of-way
within reservation boundaries and to detain non-tribal members and turn
them over to state officers for violating state law.25 Petitioner asserts the
Ninth Circuit’s decision restricts the ability of tribal officers to investigate
and detain non-Indians on public rights-of-way within reservation
boundaries, which directly conflicts with precedent and tribal authority.26
Petitioner further contends the Ninth Circuit’s approach would
limit tribal officers on public rights-of-way to only stop individuals known
to be Indian, or whose Indian status is unknown, that are violating only
tribal law.27 This approach is problematic, Petitioner maintains, because it
would preclude investigation that would otherwise be constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment and Terry v. Ohio28 and would lead to an increase
in crime.29
In summation, Petitioner argues the Ninth Circuit’s decision
would leave a gap in law enforcement on Indian reservations—a gap that
can be easily filled by tribal police, and the decision should be vacated and
remanded for further proceedings.30
B. Respondent Cooley’s Argument
Respondent argues that powers over non-Indians on public rightsof-way have never been included in an Indian tribe’s inherent sovereign
authority.31 According to Respondent, when Officer Saylor concluded Mr.
Cooley was a non-Indian, he lacked the authority to investigate and detain
him and thus violated ICRA.32 Respondent asserts that, historically, tribal
sovereignty was limited to self-government.33 Respondent cites to
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe34 for the proposition that when tribal
officers detain, search, and seize a non-Indian, they intrude on that nonIndian’s personal liberty and unlawfully exceed the tribes’
Congressionally delegated powers.35 Respondent further contends the
United States prioritizes, above all else, protecting its citizens from
intrusions over their personal liberty, which directly conflicts with the
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notion that Indian tribes have retained police power over non-Indians.36
Respondent also notions that Mcgirt v. Oklahoma37 established that
Congress is the exclusive authority over Indian affairs, and the courts
should defer to Congress to fill any jurisdictional gaps.38
In summation, Respondent argues ICRA does not create tribal
police jurisdiction over non-Indians, and the Ninth Circuit appropriately
upheld the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the illegal
searches and seizures.39
IV.

ANALYSIS

The question before the Court is whether the lower courts erred in
granting a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that a tribal police
officer lacked authority to temporarily detain and search Respondent, a
non-Indian, within a reservation on a public right-of-way, based on a
potential violation of state or federal law. The outcome could limit tribal
authority on public rights-of-way, as well as affect tribal criminal
procedure. However, the Court here will likely find for Petitioner United
States, on the grounds that public rights-of-way within reservations are
included in the definition of “Indian Country,” and the Court has never
suggested the tribes’ authority to patrol and protect on-reservation
highways excludes non-Indian suspects.
Questions of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country generally
depend on the following three factors: (1) the location of the crime; (2) the
Indian status of the offender and victim; and (3) the nature of the crime.40
Further, criminal jurisdiction of offenses committed in Indian Country “is
governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.”41 The
Indian Law and Order Commission went as far as to say, “criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country is an indefensible morass of complex,
conflicting, and illogical commands, layered in over decades via
congressional policies and court decisions and without the consent of tribal
nations.”42 Despite the complexities of this system, it is long standing
Circuit precedent that tribes retain inherent authority to reasonably protect
persons and property within reservation boundaries from Indian or nonIndian suspects—a right Congress has never eliminated.43 ICRA’s Fourth
Amendment analogue also maintains that a tribal officer may stop on
reasonable suspicion, and further detain on probable cause, non-Indian
suspects for custody and potential prosecution by state or federal

36

Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 11.
140 S. Ct. 2452 (2019).
38
Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 11.
39
Id. at 13.
40
Brief for the Former United States Attorneys as Amicus Curiae at 5, United States v. Cooley,
https://perma.cc/82RQ-X9HH (U.S. Jan. 15, 2021) (No. 19-1414).
41
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993).
42
ILOC, A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer, Report to the President and Congress of the
United States, at ix (Nov. 2013), https://perma.cc/TJU5-L3GF.
43
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 17.
37

2021

PREVIEW: UNITED STATES V. COOLEY

102

authorities.44 Additionally, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines “Indian
Country” broadly, and provides in full:
(a) All land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without
the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running the same.45
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,46 the Court addressed the scope of
tribal authority in situations involving the same type of land at issue in this
case—a public highway over Indian reservation land.47 Although the
Court held tribes lack the authority to adjudicate civil tort disputes between
non-Indians arising from state rights-of-way, the Court distinguished a
tribe’s authority to police the activities of non-Indians on a reservation’s
public roads.48 The Court further emphasized that the Court has never
“questioned the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a
reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to
detain and turn over to state officers non-members stopped on the highway
for conduct violating state law.”49
Respondent maintains that inherent tribal sovereignty does not
include police power over non-Indians on rights-of-way, and Officer
Saylor’s search and seizure of Respondent was outside tribal authority,
because he identified Respondent as a non-Indian, and the search and
seizure took place on a public right-of-way.50 However, the well-settled
precedent establishes that public rights-of-ways on an Indian reservation
are included in the definition of “Indian Country,” and the Court has not
suggested that tribal authority to patrol these public rights-of-way
excludes non-Indian suspects.51 In actuality, tribal officers may exercise
their power to detain a suspected offender and transport them to the proper
authorities, which Officer Saylor did when he notified the local county of
the situation.52 If the Court ruled for the Respondent and affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, it would severely limit a tribal officer’s authority
to make an investigative stop of anyone on a public right-of-way, which
would undermine a tribe’s authority to protect persons within reservation
44
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boundaries by prohibiting tribal police from detaining a non-Indian for an
apparent or obvious state or federal crime during the encounter.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court will likely reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision and find
for Petitioner United States. The Court will also likely follow Ninth Circuit
precedent stating tribal officers may detain non-Indian suspects and
transport them to the proper authorities. When Officer Saylor detained
Respondent, secured the area, and subsequently notified the proper
authorities to make an arrest, he was following the correct procedure to
protect himself and others on tribal land. Based on the above facts and
analysis, the Court will likely reverse and remand the Ninth Circuit’s
decision for further proceedings.

